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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tool for predicting the reactions of the New York courts to the
new enactment. In the absence of case law under the new
section, discussion of reaction or prediction would be tenuous
indeed.
The basic purpose of the Quarterly Survey is to key the
practising attorney to significant developments in New York
practice. To this end, in each installment of the survey are
set forth those cases which have a weighty impact upon the
procedural law of New York. Ideally, all the significant cases
concerning New York's procedural law would be covered. But,
because of space limitations, many other less important, but,
nevertheless, significant cases cannot be included.
Considering the raison d'etre of the Survey to be the im-
parting of information geared to keeping practitioners abreast of
the New York law of procedure, feedback from attorneys would be
an important aid in an analysis of our efforts. The St. John's
Law Review would, therefore, welcome critiques from the readers
of the Survey. In this way, perhaps, any disjunction between
the material in the Survey and the needs of the attorneys might be
effectively healed.
ARTIcLE 2- LIMITATIoNs OF TImE
CPLR 203(b)(4).: Delivery of summons in wrong county of
New York City not a bar to sixty-day extension.
CPLR 203(b) (4) provides for an automatic sixty-day exten-
sion of the statute of limitations by delivery of the summons to
the sheriff of the county where the defendant resides, is
employed, or is doing business. If the defendant is a corpora-
tion, the summons may be delivered to the sheriff "in the county
in which [the corporation] . . . may be served. .. ."
Under CPA Section 17, the predecessor of CPLR 203(b) (4),
the courts required delivery to the sheriff of the proper county
as a condition to the extension where the defendant was a
natural person.' However, this requirement was waived under
the CPLR in Kosofsky v. Spivak,' where the delivery was made
in Kings County, although defendant, a real person, lived in
Bronx County and worked in New York County. Recently, in
Wieboldt v. Rentways, Inc.,3 the supreme court held that the
iLKleila v. Miller, 1 App. Div. 2d 697, 147 N.Y.S2d 589 (2d Dep't
1955); Balter v. Janis, 200 Misc. 635, 107 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1951).
2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), N.Y.L.J., Aug. 12, 1964, p. 11, col. 1.
s 52 Misc. 2d 931, 277 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967).
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statute of limitations did not bar a suit against a corporate
defendant, even though the summons was delivered in the wrong
county. The extension was allowed despite delivery to the
sheriff's office in New York County instead of in Queens County
where the corporation could have been served. The court said
that "'an error in the choice of the proper sheriff's office should
be disregarded if no real prejudice to the defendant . . .'" would
result.4
It must be noted, however, that the courts in both Kosofsky
and Wieboldt were dealing specifically with a county in New
York City. The CPLR, in at least one instance, provides that
for a specific purpose, the five counties within New York City
are to be considered one.5 Therefore, it is conceivable that the
ruling in Wiaboldt may be limited in that respect, i.e., applicable
only in New York City.
ARTICLE 3 - JURISDICTION AND SEvicn, APPEARANCE
AND CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302: Held applicable to person who was domiciliary at
tinw of tort.
The Court of Appeals, in State v. Dav4es.o affirmed a ruling
by the appellate division, third department, that CPLR 302 is
applicable to an individual who was a domiciliary at the time he
committed a tort and a nondomiciliary at the time of service upon
him. This affirmance by New York's highest Court seemingly
ends the debate 7 as to whether a possible gap was created by the
language of 302 which might have allowed a nondomiciliary to
4 Id. at 932, 277 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
B CPLR 3110. The court may also have been aware of the Advisory
Committee's report concerning 203(b) (4) wherein it suggested that delivery
to the sheriff of New York City should be allowed to be made in any of
the five counties of New York City for convenience of administration.
1 Wmxs m r, KoraN & MinnR, NEw YoRx Civn. PRAcTcCE f203.15 (1965).
6 IS N.Y.2d 950, 223 N.E.2d 570, 277 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1966) (memo-
randum decision). The prior history of the case is discussed in The
Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 40 ST. JoHaN's L. Rgv. 303, 309
(1966), and The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JOHN'S
L. Ray. 121, 129 (1966).
7See O'Conner v. Wells, 43 Misc. 2d 1073 (Sup. Ct Greene County
1965) (held CPLR 302 applicable to one a domiciliary at the time of the act) ;
Voskrenskava v. Bary, (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), N.Y.L.J., Aug. 6, 1964, at 9,
col. 2. Contra, 7B MCKINNEY's CPLR 302, supp. commentary 83 (1964),
which stated that 302 could not be read to allow jurisdiction to be acquired
over a nondomiciliary defendant who committed one of the prescribed
acts while a domiciliary of the state.
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